Fordham Environmental Law Review
Volume 16, Number 2

Article 2

The Cartagena Protocol and the WTO: Will
the EU Biotech Products Case Leave Room
for the Protocol?
Robyn Neff∗

∗

Fordham University School of Law

Copyright c by the authors. Fordham Environmental Law Review is produced by The Berkeley
Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/elr

THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL AND THE WTO:
WILL THE EU BIOTECH PRODUCTS CASE
LEAVE ROOM FOR THE PROTOCOL?
Robyn A. Neff*
I. INTRODUCTION

On August 7, 2003, the United States requested that the Dispute
Settlement Body of the World Trade Organization establish a panel
to evaluate whether the European Union ("EU"), in imposing a
moratorium on approving imports of biotechnology products, is in
violation of the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures ("SPS Agreement") of the World Trade
Organization ("WTO").1 The SPS Agreement allows WTO Member
nations to impose restrictions to international trade necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health with minimum negative
effects on trade.
On September 11, 2003, the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety
("Cartagena Protocol" or "Protocol") to the 1992 United Nations

* J.D. candidate Fordham University School of Law, 2006; A.B.
Brown University, 2002.
1. World Trade Organization, Request for Establishment of a
Panel by the United States, European Communities-Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291/23 (Aug. 8, 2003) [hereinafter Biotech Products
dispute]. The United States alleged that the EU moratorium violated
the SPS Agreement, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
1994, the Agreement on Agriculture and the Agreement on
Technical Barriers to Trade. This Note will focus on the claims
regarding the SPS Agreement.
Biotech products refer to products of agricultural
biotechnology, i.e., living modified organisms.
2. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures, Sept. 27, 1994, preamble para. 1, 4, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/15sps_01_e.htm
[hereinafter SPS Agreement].
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Convention on Biological Diversity became international law. 3 The
Protocol establishes a structure for the protection of biological
diversity and human health from adverse effects of the international
transfer and use of Living Modified Organisms ("LMOs"). 4 The
Protocol defines an LMO as "any living organism that possesses a
novel combination of genetic material obtained through the use of
5
modem biotechnology."
There is debate as to whether and how the Protocol conflicts with
the SPS Agreement. 6 Potential conflicts include the extent of
scientific evidence necessary to impose a trade restriction, the
conditions under which Parties to the agreements may impose a
restriction in the absence of scientific evidence, and the obligations
of non-Parties engaging in international trade in LMOs. This Note
examines the current dispute before the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body regarding the EU moratorium on the importation of LMOs,
and whether the WTO Panel will interpret the SPS Agreement
compatibly with the Protocol in later disputes. Part II of this Note
outlines key provisions of the Protocol and the SPS Agreement. Part
III analyzes their potential for both procedural and substantive
conflict. Part IV examines case law of the WTO Dispute Settlement
Body treating the SPS Agreement. Part V applies the current
Biotechnology Products dispute in examining whether the Cartagena
Protocol can be effective in the context of the SPS Agreement and

3. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, Jan. 29, 2000 , available at http://www.biodiv.
org/biosafety/protocol.asp [hereinafter Protocol].
4. Id. at art. 1. The term "LMO" is essentially interchangeable
with "GMO"-genetically modified organism. See Olivette RiveraTorres, The Biosafety Protocoland the WTO, 26 B.C. INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 263, 270-71 (2003).
5. Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 3(g).
6. See, e.g., Steve Charnovitz, The Supervision of Health and
Biosafety Regulation by World Trade Rules, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 271
(2000); Rivera-Torres, supra note 4; Sabrina Safrin, Treaties in
Collision? The Biosafety Protocol and the World Trade
OrganizationAgreements, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 606 (2002); Patrick J.
Vallely, Tension between the CartagenaProtocol and the WTO: the
Significance of Recent WTO Developments in an Ongoing Debate, 5
CHI.J. INT'L L. 369 (2004).
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the implications for environmental protection in the regime of
international trade in LMOs.
II. BACKGROUND

A. CartagenaProtocol on Biosafety: Key Provisions
1. Advance Informed Agreement Procedure
The advance informed agreement procedure ("AIA procedure")
described in Articles 8 through 10 of the Cartagena Protocol
provides the regulatory structure of the Protocol. The procedure first
requires a Party exporting an LMO to notify the importing Party
prior to the intentional transboundary movement of the LMO. 7 The
exporting Party must include a biological description of the LMO, its
characteristics as a result of genetic modification, its intended use, a
risk assessment of its potential effects, and suggested methods for
safe handling. 8 The importing Party must acknowledge receipt of
notification in writing and undertake a risk assessment in deciding
whether to permit the transboundary movement of the LMO. 9 The
risk assessment shall be "scientifically sound" and based, at
minimum, on "available scientific evidence in order to identify and
evaluate the possible adverse effects of living modified organisms on
the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity." 10 The
Protocol allows the importing party to account additionally for risks
to human health.1
The AIA Procedure does not apply to LMOs intended for direct
use as food, feed, or for processing. 12 Under Article 11 of the
Protocol, Parties may restrict the import of LMOs of this type in
accordance with a domestic regulatory framework that is "consistent
with the objective of this Protocol."' All parties that make a final
decision regarding the domestic use of an LMO, including placement
on the market, must inform the other Parties through the Biosafety
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 8.1.
Id.at annex I.
Id. at art. 9, 10, 15.
Id. at art. 15.1.
Id.
Id.at art. 11.
Id.at art. 11.4.

264

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL IA W REVIEW

[VOL. XVI

Clearing-House of its characteristics and suggested methods of
handling and use, where appropriate. 14 The information reported to
the Biosafety Clearing-House must contain a risk assessment
pursuant to Annex III of the Protocol.' 5 Article 11 explicitly
addresses the needs of a Party that is a developing country or a Party
with an economy in transition in the event that it lacks a domestic
16
regulatory framework consistent with the objective of the Protocol.
It allows such a Party to declare through the Biosafety ClearingHouse that it will make its decision as to the first import of an LMO
for direct use as food or feed or for processing according
to an
17
time.
of
period
specified
a
within
assessment
risk
Annex III
2. The Precautionary Principle
Despite the preference for decisions based on scientific principles,
the Protocol allows an importing Party to deny access to LMOs of
the exporting Party without scientific proof of the LMO's adverse
effects on biodiversity or human health. 18 The purpose of this
"precautionary principle" is to "avoid or minimize such potential
adverse effects."' 9 The precautionary principle might allow Parties
that lack developed scientific infrastructure to respond to the
perceived threat of introducing LMOs into their environment.

14. Id. at art. 11.1, annex II. Article 20 of the Protocol establishes
the Biosafety Clearing-House to facilitate the exchange of scientific
and other information on LMOs and to assist Parties in
implementing the Protocol.
15. Id. at annex I1(j).
16. Id. atart. 11.6.
17. Id. at art. 11.6(a), 11.6(b). Article 11.9 entitles Parties in need
of financial or technical assistance to cooperation from other Parties
in meeting its obligations to the Protocol. See id. at art. 22, 28. This
includes assistance with the use of risk assessments. See, e.g., id. at
art 22.2.
18. Id. at art. 10.6.
19. Id.; see also id. at art. 11.8. Outside of the scope of the AIA
Procedure, Article 11 contains a precautionary principle identical to
art. 10.6, except in its application to LMOs intended for direct use as
food or feed, or for processing.
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3. Dispute Resolution
The Cartagena Protocol establishes the means for dispute
resolution through two enabling provisions. Article 27 requires the
Conference of the Parties 20 to, at its first meeting, adopt procedures
for a regime of liability and redress for damage resulting from
transboundary movement of LMOs, considering and elaborating on
relevant international rules and procedures. 2 1 The Conference of the
22
Parties shall endeavor to complete this task within four years.
During the negotiations of the Protocol, participants were unable to
agree on the form of a liability regime and included Article 27 as a
compromise to enable subsequent discussions on the issue. 23 The
first meeting of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting
of the Parties to the Protocol ("COP-MOP") took place in February
2004. 24 The meeting established an "Open-ended Ad Hoc Working
Group of Legal and Technical Experts on Liability and Redress" to
fulfill the Article 27 mandate. 25 The Ad Hoc Group will review
information relating to liability and redress for damage from
transboundary movement of LMOs, analyze potential or actual
damage scenarios and the application of international rules for
liability and redress, and elaborate options for rules and procedures
on liability and redress. 26 The Ad Hoc Group is to report its
activities to the COP-MOP and complete its work in 2007.27
20. The Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, serving as the meeting of the Parties to the Protocol
[hereinafter COP-MOP], is the governing body of the Protocol.
21. Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 27.
22. Id.
23. Elizabeth Duall, A Liability and Redress Regime for
Genetically Modified Organisms under the Cartagena Protocol, 36
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 173, 188 (2004).
24. Id. at 184.
25. Official Website of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
United
Nations
Environment
Programme,
at
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/liability2.aspx (last visited
May 18, 2005); see COP-MOP 1 Decision BS-1/8, at
http://www.biodiv.org/decisions/default.aspx?m=MOP01 &id=8290&lg=0 (last visited May 18, 2005).
26. Id.
27. Id.
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Article 34 of the Protocol addresses compliance with the terms of
the Protocol; the Protocol requires the Conference of the Parties, at
its first meeting, to negotiate and approve procedures and
mechanisms to promote compliance with the Protocol and to respond
Article 34 states that the compliance
to non-compliance. 2 9
procedures shall be "separate from, and without prejudice to," the
dispute settlement procedures established by the Convention on
Biological Diversity. 30 At its first meeting, the COP-MOP adopted
procedures and mechanisms on compliance and established a
Compliance Committee to promote compliance, address noncompliance, and provide advice or assistance to Parties. 3' In
instances of repeated non-compliance with the Protocol, the COPMOP will "take appropriate action." 32 At its first meeting, the
Compliance Committee intended to develop rules and procedures to

29. Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 34.
30. Id. Article 27 of the Convention on Biological Diversity
provides for dispute settlement by negotiation concerning
interpretation or application of the Convention. United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development: Convention on
Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, para. 1, available at
http://www.biodiv.org/convention/articles.asp [hereinafter CBD].
Parties can request third-party mediation if they cannot reach
agreement by negotiation. Id. at para. 2. If a dispute is not resolved
by either negotiation or mediation, Parties may agree to submit to
arbitration or to the International Court of Justice. Id. at para. 3(a),
3(b). If Parties do not accept the means of dispute resolution under
paragraph 3, the dispute will be submitted to conciliation. Id. at
para. 4, annex II Part 2.
31. Official Website of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
United Nations Environment Programme, http://www.biodiv.org/
biosafety/issues/compliance2.aspx (last visited May 18, 2005); see
available
at
1
Decision
BS-1/7,
COP-MOP
default.aspx?m=MOPhttp://www.biodiv.org/decisions/
01&id=8289&lg=0.
available
at
32. COP-MOP
1
Decision
BS-1/7,
http://www.biodiv.org/
decisions/default.aspx?m=MOP0 1&id=8289&lg=0.
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be approved by the COP-MOP. 33 At present, the mechanisms for
dispute resolution under the Protocol are formative.
B. WTO Sanitary and PhytosanitaryMeasuresAgreement: Key
Provisions
1. Scientific Evidence Requirement
The SPS Agreement does not contain a counterpart to the AIA
procedure of the Cartagena Protocol. The SPS Agreement allows
WTO Members to restrict trade in LMOs as necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health as consistent with the
Agreement. 34 The SPS Agreement is presumed to be consistent with
the provisions of GATT 1994, 35 which restricts Members' ability to
erect barriers to international trade. 36 Affording importance to
unrestricted trade, WTO Members, under the SPS Agreement, "shall
ensure that any sanitary or phytosanitary measure is applied only to
the extent necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health,
is based on scientific principles
and is not maintained without
' 37
sufficient scientific evidence.
The Agreement prohibits Members from imposing arbitrary or
unjustifiably discriminatory measures on other Member states, where
there exist similar conditions between those Members or in its own
State. 38 This emphasizes the priority of unrestricted trade and the
requirement that any restrictions based on sanitary or phytosanitary
concerns-an exception deemed to be essential to human and
environmental health-be based on scientific principles rather than
unregulated trade discrimination.

33. Official Website of the Convention on Biological Diversity,
United
Nations
Environment
Programme,
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/issues/compliance2.aspx
(last
visited May 18, 2005).
34. SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2.1.
35. Id. at art. 3.2.
36. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61
Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter GATT].
37. SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 2.2.
38. Id. at art. 2.3.
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2. Precautionary Principle
The Agreement provides an exception when a Member lacks
sufficient scientific evidence to restrict imports, but believes that
protective barriers against imports are necessary. In such an
instance, a Member may "provisionally adopt sanitary or
phytosanitary measures on the basis of available pertinent
information," and shall obtain more objective scientific information
within a reasonable time. 39 The WTO Appellate Body has
interpreted the failure to present scientific evidence as "'a strong
indication that there are no such studies or reports." '40 The
Appellate Body has held that a party must show "probability, not
just possibility, of risk to the environment or human health. 41
3. Dispute Resolution
The WTO Dispute Resolution system resolves disputes that arise
out of the SPS Agreement. The SPS Agreement places dispute
resolution within the framework of GATT and the Dispute
Settlement Understanding, 42 which establishes a Dispute Settlement
Body to administer the rules and procedures established for
consultation and dispute settlement between WTO Members. 43 The
United States brought its complaint against the EU before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body. The Dispute Settlement Body adjudicates
many disputes concerning WTO law, but the SPS provision reserves
the right of WTO Members to resort to other methods of dispute

39. Id. at art. 5.7.
40. DAVID PALMETER & PETROS C. MALVROIDIS, DISPUTE
SETTLEMENT IN THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 150 (2d ed.
2004) (quoting World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report,
Japan-Measures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R,
para. 137 (Mar. 19, 1999)).
41. Vallely, supra note 6, at 372 (citing Joost Pauwelyn, Applying
SPS in WTO Disputes, in David Robertson and Aynsley Kellow, eds,
GLOBALIZATION AND THE ENVIRONMENT: RISK ASSESSMENT AND

THE WTO

63, 66 (Edward Elgar 2001)).
42. SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 11.1.
43. GATT, supra note 36, at annex 2; Understanding on Rules
and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, http://www.wto.org/english/docs-e/legal-e/28-dsu.pdf.
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resolution, including submission to other international
bodies or
44
agreements.
international
other
under
mechanisms

Ill. POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT

The pith of the SPS Agreement and the Protocol potentially abut
one another, and the Agreements must be interpreted as to their
applicability under international law. Procedural and substantive
conflicts arise in light of potential trade schemes.
A. Procedural
1. Cartagena Protocol Savings Clause
Under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, if two
treaties on the same subject matter have incompatible
45 provisions, the
later treaty prevails for parties to both agreements. The later treaty
may provide that the earlier treaty prevails in such instances; such
provisions are referred to as "savings clauses" because they maintain
the applicability of the earlier treaty, whose provisions would
otherwise
be superseded by the incompatible provisions of the later
46
treaty.
The Cartagena Protocol, in force almost a decade after the SPS
Agreement, twice refers to Parties' existing obligations under
international law. Its preamble emphasizes that it "shall not be
interpreted as implying a change in the rights and obligations of a
Party under any existing international agreements. 47 The body of
the Protocol again emphasizes Parties' rights and obligations under
international law, stating that it does not restrict Parties' rights to
take environmentally protective measures that surpass the
requirements of the Protocol, provided that the measures comply
with the Party's existing international obligations.
Thus, if
44. SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 11.3.
45. United Nations Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, art. 30 (Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter
Vienna Convention].
46. Safrin, supra note 6, at 613.
47. Protocol, supra note 3, preamble para. 10.
48. Id. at art. 2.4.
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provisions of the Protocol are interpreted to conflict with provisions
of the SPS Agreement, the SPS Agreement governs a dispute under
such a provision. This holds true for parties to both agreements and
for parties only to the SPS Agreement.
To effectively examine the potential outcomes of LMO disputes,
one must analyze whether the agreements in fact conflict. The
Convention on Biological Diversity, the parent to the Protocol,
contains its own savings clause, separate from that in the Protocol.49
The savings clause contains an exception under which its provisions
will apply despite existing international agreement: "[t]he provisions
of this Convention shall not affect the rights and obligations of any
Contracting Party deriving from any existing international
agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations
5
would cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity.
Depending on the damage or threat of LMOs to biodiversity, the
Cartagena Protocol, as part of the Convention on Biological
51
Diversity, might take precedence over existing trade agreements.
Numerous risks of LMOs to the environment and health remain
untested and uncertain, and it may be impossible to conduct a
meaningful risk assessment. 52 Based on the myriad risks that may
constitute at least a threat to biodiversity, the provisions of the
Convention on Biological Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol
could prevail under this clause of the Convention.

49. CBD, supra note 30, at art. 22.
50. Id. (emphasis added).
51. See Gretchen L. Gaston & Randall S. Abate, The Biosafety
Protocol and the World Trade Organization:Can the Two Coexist?,
12 PACE INT'L L. REV. 107, 118 (2000).
52. Id. at 119. For a detailed discussion of the potential benefits
and risks of LMOs, see Simonetta Zarrilli, International Trade in
Genetically Modified Organisms and Multilateral Negotiations: a
New Dilemma for Developing Countries, in ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN
RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE 40, 41-5 (Frencesco Francioni,
ed., 2001); Mystery Bridgers, Genetically Modified Organisms and
the Precautionary Principle: How the GMO Dispute Before the
World Trade Organization Could Decide the Fate of International
GMO Regulation, 22 TEMP. ENVTL. L. & TECH. J. 171, 173-75

(2004).
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Additionally, GATT carves out exceptions for limitations on trade.
In its preamble, the SPS Agreement 53 refers to GATT 1994 Article
XX.I(b), which states that nothing in GATT shall be construed to
prevent any Member from adopting measures necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health, subject to the prohibition on
arbitrary or discriminatory trade restrictions between Member
countries where similar conditions exist.54 The SPS Agreement
elaborates rules for applying GATT provisions relating to the use of
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, particularly Article XX(b).55
The SPS Agreement's express implication of the GATT exceptions
to unrestricted trade indicates the significance of measures protecting
health and the environment, and that they should not be subordinate
to those of unrestricted international trade.
2. Trade Between Non-Parties
The Cartagena Protocol contemplates LMO trade between Parties
and non-Parties; it permits Parties to enter into bilateral, regional and
multilateral agreements with non-Parties. 56 All transboundary
movements of LMOs between Parties and non-Parties must be
consistent with the objective of the Protocol.57 Parties are to
encourage non-Parties to submit information of their activities with
LMOs to the Biosafety Clearing-House. 58 Because the United States
is not a signatory to the Convention on Biological Diversity, it is not
a Party to the Cartagena Protocol. However, the United States was
active in the Protocol negotiations, calling for a savings clause to
protect Parties' rights and obligations under existing international
agreements-specifically
WTO
Agreements,
which
favor
59
unrestricted trade. The EU advocated that the Cartagena Protocol
should take precedence over international trade agreements,

53.
54.
55.
56.

SPS Agreement, supra note 2, preamble para. 8.
GATT, supra note 36, at art. XX(b).
SPS Agreement, supra note 2, preamble para. 8.
Protocol, supra note 3, at art 24.1.

57. Id.

58. Id. at art. 24.2.
59. See, e.g., Duall, supra note 23, at 178-79; Gaston & Abate,
supra note 51, at 121; Safrin, supra note 6, at 614-15.
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emphasizing environmental concerns. However, the success of the
United States and aligned Parties in advocating a savings clause
"illustrates that any [Multinational Environmental Agreement]
having a negative economic impact on trade could be challenged by
those countries negatively affected,
especially the United States,
' 61
WTO.
the
of
auspices
under the
B. Substantive
1. Scientific Evidence Requirement and Precautionary Principles
The Protocol and the SPS Agreement detail risk assessment
procedures under which countries may restrict imports. Under the
Protocol, a Party must comply with the risk assessment procedures
in making its AIA decision, 6 2 which shall be undertaken in a
"scientifically sound manner." 63 The risk assessment shall consider
the novel characteristics of the LMO that may adversely affect
biodiversity in the recipient environment, the likelihood of such
effects occurring, and the projected consequences. 64 Additionally,
an importing Party may consider risks to human health.65
The deference that an importing Party accords risks to human
health influences the scope of the Cartagena Protocol and protective
measures Parties may take in accordance with it. Article 4 of the
Protocol defines its scope-the Protocol shall apply to the
"transboundary movement, transit, handling and use of all living
modified organisms that may have adverse effects on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also
into account risks to human health.' ' 66 Alternative interpretations of
this phrase, and its inclusion of the word "also," serve to both limit
and broaden the scope of the Protocol.
The Protocol refers to risks to human health similarly throughout
the Protocol, 67 once mentioning it independently. 68 On one hand, the
60. Duall, supra note 23, at 179-80.
61. Gaston & Abate, supra note 51, at 123.
62. Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 10.1.
63. Id. at art. 15.1.
64. Id. at annex 11I.
65. Id.
66. Id. at art. 4 (emphasis added).
67. See, e.g., id. preamble para. 5; id. at art. 1, 4, 10.6, 15.1; id. at
annex 111. 1.
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word "also" can indicate that risks to human health are secondary to
concerns of diminishing biodiversity. Under this interpretation, the
Protocol can be read to exclude from its scope products that do not
pose a direct risk to biodiversity even if they pose a risk to human
health. 669 On the other hand, "also" does not necessarily indicate that
risks to human health are of inferior consideration; it merely
indicates an additional factor in environmental impact.
The
independent reference to risks to human health in Article 2.5
supports this view. 70 Under this view, the Protocol does not
necessarily exclude products from its scope the risks of which are
based heavily on human health. A third view suggested by one
commentator interprets the provision as limiting its scope to LMOs
that will be introduced into the environment, rather than for direct
use as food or feed or for processing, and giving independent weight
to considerations of human health. 1 This view is most consistent
with the different treatment that the Protocol affords to LMOs
introduced directly into the environment and those for direct use as
food or feed or for processing,72 although the Protocol does not
explicitly accord greater importance to LMOs for one purpose over
the other. This interpretation would allow consideration of health
from LMOs introduced into the environment, but not from LMOs
directly consumed. In the negotiation of the Protocol, most countries
advocated that the phrase "taking also into account risks to human
health" should encompass only "indirect human health 73
impacts that
could arise as a result of direct impacts on biodiversity."
Depending upon which interpretation a Party implementing
restrictive measures gives to the provision, it might enlarge the scope
of permissible measures under the precautionary principle. For
68. Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 2.5.
69. Rivera-Torres, supra note 4, at 274-75.
70. See id. at 274. In outlining the scope of the measures that
Parties may take to protect biodiversity, Article 2.5 states: "The
Parties are encouraged to take into account, as appropriate, available
expertise, instruments and work undertaken in international forums
with competence in the area of risks to human health."
71. Id. at 275.
72. See Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 8-10; cf art. 11.
73. Rivera-Torres, supra note 4, at 275 (quoting Aarti Gupta,
Creating a Global Biosafety Regime, 2 INT'L J. BIOTECH. 205, 211
(2000)).
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example, under the first interpretation, in which risks to human
health are secondary to concerns of effects on biodiversity, a Party
would likely not be able to invoke the precautionary principle based
solely on insufficient evidence regarding risks to human health.
Under the second interpretation, in which environmental concerns
and risks to human health are of tantamount importance, a Party
could likely use a lack of sufficient information about risks to human
health to invoke the precautionary principle. Under the third
interpretation, favored by most negotiating countries to the
Protocol,74 a Party could invoke the precautionary principle in its
decision to import only specific LMOs to be introduced directly into
the environment that would effect biodiversity, but which might also
affect human health. Although this interpretation narrows the scope
of LMOs for which a Party can invoke the precautionary principle, it
broadens the reasons for which a Party may invoke it. For example,
a Party might have sufficient scientific information about the effects
the LMO will have on biodiversity and the environment, but might
lack scientific evidence as to the risks it poses to human health.
The precautionary principle of the Cartagena Protocol can be read
to permit trade restrictions due to a wider range of reasons than its
counterpart in the SPS Agreement.
The Protocol allows
precautionary measures in the event of scientific uncertainty due to
insufficient scientific information regarding the extent of potential
adverse effects that the LMO will have on biodiversity and human
health. 75 This might permit a Party to invoke the precautionary
principle upon citing potential impacts of already-defined risks. The
SPS Agreement, on the other hand, allows Members to provisionally
adopt precautionary measures based on relevant information,
including that from international organizations or those adopted by
other Members "where relevant scientific evidence is insufficient."' 6
This language outlines the same standard of insufficient scientific
information as the Protocol, but indicates international standards that
Members may lawfully invoke, and intent to defer to them in the
event of a dispute. One commentator notes that the Protocol's
precautionary principle "gives much deference to environmental
concerns of individual states., 77 Additionally, decisions of the WTO
74.
75.
76.
77.

See supra text accompanying note 72.
Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 10.6.
SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 5.7.
Vallely, supra note 6, at 375.
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dispute settlement body demonstrate a "general hostility by78the
WTO to environmental claims of ambiguous scientific validity.,
In contrast to the Cartagena Protocol, the SPS Agreement
expressly allows WTO Members to restrict international trade by
adopting measures "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life
or health." 79 The same language in the body of the Agreement
describes the obligations of Members under the Agreement; the use
of the word "necessary" circumscribes the scope of permissible
restrictions on trade.
Interpreted with a focus on the word
"necessary," a Member would have to justify its restrictions on trade
under a strict level of scrutiny to show their necessity. However,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures themselves are defined by the
SPS Agreement without modification by the word "necessary;" the
Agreement states only that a sanitary or phytosanitary measure is
"[a]ny measure applied: to protect animal or plant life or health"
under certain circumstances or "to prevent or limit other damage
within the territory of the Member." 82 The provisions of the
Agreement that govern the procedures by which Members may
implement sanitary or phytosanitary measures use only those
terms-sanitary and phytosanitary measures-without modification
by the word "necessary. ' 83 Without this modification, the SPS
Agreement can be interpreted more broadly to include restrictions
that protect health and life, but that are not necessary to protect
health and life. The Agreement defers to international norms in
construing "necessary":
"[s]anitary or phytosanitary measures
which conform to international standards, guidelines or
recommendations shall be deemed to be necessary to protect human,
animal or plant life or health, and presumed to be consistent with the
relevant provisions of this Agreement... ,,84
78. Id.; see, e.g., infra Part IV.
79. SPS Agreement, supra note 2, preamble para. 1.
80. Id. at art. 2.1, 2.2.
81. See id. at art. 2.2: "Members shall ensure that any sanitary or
phytosanitary measure is applied only to the extent necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health, is based on scientific
principles and is not maintained without sufficient scientific
evidence..." (emphasis added).
82. Id. at annex A(1)(a)-(d).
83. Seeid. atart.5.
84. Id. at art. 3.2.
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Elaboration of the meaning of "necessary" appears in the context
of risk assessments. Members must base sanitary or phytosanitary
measures on "an assessment, as appropriate to the circumstances, of
the risks to human, animal or plant life or health, taking into account
risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international
organizations." 85 Members shall ensure that measures "are not more
trade-restrictive than required to achieve their appropriate level of
sanitary or phytosanitary protection." 86 A footnote to the provision
clarifies that "a measure is not more trade-restrictive than required
unless there is another measure, reasonably available taking into
account technical and economic feasibility, that achieves the
appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection and is
significantly less restrictive to trade." 87 Although protections are
limited in that they must not be more restrictive than "required," the
footnote to the provision carves out a zone of permissibility in which
the measure in question will not be considered more restrictive than
required unless there is another reasonably available measure that
could achieve the same protective end. Thus, if there is no
reasonably available alternative, the sanitary or phytosanitary
measure in question is presumptively not more restrictive than
permitted by the Agreement. Interpreting the Agreement in this way
broadens its protective scope beyond the Article 2 obligation of
"necessity" to protect human, animal or plant life or health.
Because the character of restrictions permitted by the Cartagena
Protocol and the SPS Agreement may each be interpreted broadly or
narrowly, the zone of overlap between the two Agreements is
difficult to define. On the one hand, the Cartagena Protocol may be
read more broadly than the SPS Agreement: a Party may prohibit
importation of an LMO due to lack of scientific certainty about its
effects and might invoke the precautionary principle in a number of

85. Id. at art. 5.1. "Relevant international organizations" include
the Codex Alimentarius Commission (created in 1963 by the United
Nations ("UN") Food and Agriculture Organization and the UN
World Health Organization to develop food standards and
guidelines), the International Office of Epizootics, and organizations
operating within the framework of the Plant Protection Convention.
Id. preamble, para. 6.
86. Id. at art. 5.6.
87. Id. at note 3.
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scenarios. 8 8 On the other hand, the SPS Agreement may be
interpreted as more broad: the international norms that serve as risk
assessment guidelines come from a variety of sources, and because
the Agreement does not circumscribe the sources, 89 a Member might
adopt sanitary or phytosanitary measures more restrictive than the
Cartagena Protocol's Annex III would allow, and find or interpret a
relevant international norm in support.
Additionally, the permissible factors for consideration in a risk
assessment are broader under the SPS Agreement than under the
Cartagena Protocol; under the SPS Agreement, Members may take
into account available scientific evidence and relevant economic
factors. 9° The economic factors are confined to rectifying damage to
production or sales in the event of the spread of disease, the costs of
control or eradication, and the cost-effectiveness of alternative
approaches to mitigating risks. 9 1 Because the Cartagena Protocol is
an environmental agreement, it does not govern trade restrictions on
LMOs imposed for economic reasons. The Protocol does allow
Parties to account for, in a manner "consistent with their
international obligations," socio-economic considerations that will
arise from the "impact of living modified organisms on the
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity. 92
However, this provision confines itself to socio-economic
considerations that arise from the impact of LMOs on biodiversitynot those that arise from direct impact on the market for certain
products.
2. Dispute resolution
Problems may arise as to the forum for dispute resolution
depending on whether the Agreements are interpreted as conflicting.
This will not be a problem when parties to a dispute are not parties to
88. See supra text accompanying note 73.
89. See, e.g., SPS Agreement, supra note 2, preamble, para. 6
(using the word "including"), art. 3.2 (not specifying particular
international standards).
90. Id. at art. 5.2, 5.3.
91. Id. at art. 5.3.
92. Protocol art 26.1. The provision adds that Parties should
make such considerations "especially with regard to the value of
biological diversity to indigenous and local communities."
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the same Agreements. For example, the United States is not a Party
to the Cartagena Protocol; the EU is a Party. 93 Both the United
94
States and the EU are Members of the World Trade Organization.
A dispute will be settled in the forum for the Treaty under which it
arises, which will be the Treaty to which both parties are bound.
If the parties to the dispute are Parties to both the SPS Agreement
and the Cartagena Protocol, the complaining Party would choose the
forum likely to favor its case. A Party alleging that another Party
wrongfully maintains restrictive measures to trade, or that it refuses
to import that Party's LMOs, would likely seek redress under the
SPS Agreement, because the WTO disfavors discriminatory trade
restrictions. 95 The Protocol might be invoked only as a defense, in
which case the defending Party would have to argue that its rights
under the Protocol supersede obligations under the SPS
Agreement.
Because disputes under the Protocol would relate to
transboundary trade, an action necessarily implicates the SPS
Agreement; thus, any Party with a cause of action, i.e. alleging that
another Party is overly restrictive, would choose the WTO Dispute
Settlement forum. Although the measures for settling disputes under
the Protocol are in development, 97 forum shopping would likely
favor the WTO Dispute Settlement Body.

IV. WTO

DISPUTE RESOLUTION AND THE

SPS

AGREEMENT:

BACKGROUND FOR THE BIOTECHNOLOGY PRODUCTS DISPUTE

In May 2003, the United States submitted a request for
consultation to the Dispute Settlement Body of the WTO, alleging
that the EU's 1998 moratorium on the approval of biotechnology
products for import or market violates provisions of the SPS

93. 125 countries are Parties to the Cartagena Protocol. Official
on
Biosafety,
website
of
the
Cartagena
Protocol
http://www.biodiv.org/biosafety/ default.aspx (last visited Aug 3,
2005).
94. The WTO has 148 Members. Official website of the World
Trade Organization, http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/whatise/
tif-e/org6_e.htm (last visited May 18, 2005).
95. See GATT, supra note 36, preamble, para. 3.
96. See supra Part III.A.
97. See supra Part II.A.3.
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Agreement ("Biotech Products dispute"). 98 The complaint frames
the moratorium solely as a breach of international trade regulations.
Because the United States is not a party to the Convention on
Biological Diversity, it would not seek redress under the Cartagena
regime. Moreover, because the United States brings action against a
Member defending itself on environmental grounds, it has no reason
to seek redress under the Cartagena regime-it would more wisely
seek redress under a trade-friendly regime.
The Biotech Products dispute, because of the LMO subject matter,
is the first WTO dispute that will implicate the Cartagena Protocol.
However, the WTO panel has previously adjudicated disputes that
implicate environmental concerns. In 1997, the Dispute Settlement
Body held that the European Communities' import ban on meat from
cattle treated with growth hormone ("Hormones dispute") violated
its obligations under the SPS Agreement.99
The European
°0
Communities invoked the precautionary principle
to justify the
ban as protecting human health. Without ruling on whether the
precautionary principle is part of customary international law,' 0 ' the
Appellate Body noted that the precautionary principle does not
supersede a Member's obligation to undertake a proper risk
assessment under Article 5.1 and 5.2.102 The Appellate Body
affirmed the decision of the Panel below,
holding that the ban was
10 3
assessment.
risk
scientific
a
on
based
not
98. World Trade Organization, Request for Consultations by the
United States, European Communities-Measures Affecting the
Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products, WT/DS291/1 (May
20, 2003). The complaint alleged violations of Articles 2.2, 2.3, 5.1,
5.2, 5.5, 5.6, 7 and 8, and Annex B(l), B(2), B(5), C(l)(a), C(l)(b)
and C(1)(e) of the SPS Agreement.
99. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body, EC
Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Procduts (Hormones),
WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R, at para. 113, 114, 158(1) (Jan.
16, 1998) [hereinafter Appellate Body-Beef Hormones].
100. See SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 3.3, 5.7.
101. See Appellate Body-Beef Hormones, supra note 99, at para.
123.
102. Id. at para. 125.
103. Id.; see also Safrin, supra note 6, at 616. The WTO Panel
held that the EC's restrictions on the hormone exceeded the
"international standards, guidelines or recommendations" on which
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In 2003, the WTO Dispute Settlement Body again ruled in favor of
the United States in holding that Japan, which had since 1994
imposed restrictions on the importation of United States apples4
("Apples dispute"), violated provisions of the SPS Agreement.'0
Unlike the Beef Hormone dispute, in which the restrictive measure
was for the protection of human health, Japan had implemented trade
restrictions to protect the phytosanitary health of its apple crops and
other agricultural products, which it argued were vulnerable to the
North American "fire blight" bacterium. 0 5 The Appellate Body did
not defer to Japan's risk assessment of importing United States
apples, finding that the importation restrictions were "clearly
disproportionate to the risk identified on the basis of the scientific

the SPS Agreement Article 3.1 requires members to base their
sanitary and phytosanitary measures. International standards, which
determined five of the six disputed hormones to be safe, came from
the Codex Alimentarius. Additionally, every country that examined
the hormones found them to be safe. A Member taking restrictive
measures not based on international standards may look to Article
3.3 of the SPS Agreement for justification. Article 3.3 permits a
Member to introduce sanitary or phytosanitary measures that result
in a higher level of protection than measures based on international
standards would achieve "if there is a scientific justification," or if
the Member determines that the level of protection is necessary after
an Article 5 risk assessment. Scientific justification exists if after a
risk assessment a member determines that international standards are
not sufficient to achieve an appropriate level of sanitary or
phytosanitary protection. For a detailed description of the case, see
Kevin C. Kennedy, Resolving International Sanitary and
PhytosanitaryDisputes in the WTO: Lessons and Future Directions,
55 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 81 (2000); David G. Victor, The Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: an
Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 865
(2000).
104. World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel, JapanMeasures Affecting the Importation of Apples, WT/DS245/R (July
15, 2003). The United States alleged violations of Articles 2.2, 2.3,
5.1, 5.2, 5.3, 5.6, 6.1, 6.2 and 7 and Annex B of the SPS Agreement.
105. Id.; see also Vallely, supra note 6, at 374.
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evidence available."' 0 6 The Appellate Body concluded that "Japan's
phytosanitary measure at issue is maintained 'without sufficient
within the meaning of Article 2.2 of the SPS
scientific evidence'
10 7
Agreement.,
Invoking Article 5.7 of the SPS Agreement as a defense to its
violation of Article 2.2, Japan claimed that its phytosanitary import
restriction was not maintained without sufficient scientific evidence
under Article 2.2, or that alternatively, the measure was a
"provisional" measure within the meaning of Article 5.7. l10 In
response, the Appellate Body held that the measure was maintained
where "the 'relevant scientific evidence' [about the risks of
transmission of fire blight bacterium through apples] is not
'insufficient, ' ' 09 the necessary condition to invoke Article 5.7. It
also held that Article 5.7 is not a defense to a violation of Article 2.2
in cases of "scientific uncertainty" as opposed to scientific
insufficiency, 1° thereby prohibiting Japan from invoking the
precautionary principle in its defense.
Would the cases have been decided differently if the products had
been genetically modified and the Cartagena Protocol had been in
force? Both the Beef Hormone dispute and the Apples dispute
demonstrate the reluctance of the WTO Dispute Settlement Body to
uphold a sanitary or phytosanitary measure based on the
precautionary principle. A commentator on the Beef Hormones
dispute suggests that the case would not have been decided
differently. l" The Appellate Body found that the ban was not based
on a scientific risk assessment,1 2 which is similarly required by the
Protocol. 1 3 Additionally, the Appellate body held that the Article
106. World Trade Organization, Report of the Appellate Body,
Affecting
the Importation
of Apples,
Japan-Measures
WT/DS/245/AB/R para. 163 (Nov. 26, 2003) [hereinafter Appellate
Body-Apples] (quoting World Trade Organization, Report of the
Panel, Japan - Measures Affecting the Importation of Apples
WT/DS245/R at para. 8, 198).
107. Id. at para. 168.
108. Id. at para. 171.
109. Id. at para. 182.
110. Id. at para. 184.
111. See Safrin, supra note 6, at 626.
112. See supra text accompanying note 102.
113. See Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 10.
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5.7 precautionary principle does not supersede a Member's
obligation under Articles 5.1 and 5.2.1 14 In their requirements of
scientific risk assessments, both the Protocol and the SPS Agreement
reflect that "[p]recaution is not a substitute for science but is to be
exercised as part of a science-based system."''15 The precautionary
principles in both Agreements are triggered by insufficient relevant
scientific evidence or information about the LMO, 16 but emphasize
that restrictions imposed under such conditions should be bolstered
by additional
relevant information in a given or reasonable amount
1 17
of time.
For similar reasons, it is unlikely that the WTO Appellate Body
would reach a different decision in the Apples dispute. The
Appellate Body prohibited Japan from invoking the SPS Agreement,
Article 5.7 in its defense," 8 upholding the Panel's finding that Japan
maintained restrictive measures on trade without sufficient scientific
evidence of risk, in violation of Article 2.2.119 A risk assessment in
compliance with the SPS Agreement "is not satisfied merely by a
general discussion of the disease sought120 to be avoided by the
imposition of a phytosanitary measure;'
it must "connect the
12 1
possibility of adverse effects with an antecedent or cause."'
Because the Cartagena Protocol requires a risk assessment "taking
into account recognized risk assessment techniques,"' 122 the Protocol
would likely not have imposed procedurally different obligations on
Japan in undertaking its risk assessment; the Appellate Body
similarly would have been dissatisfied.

114. See Appellate Body-Beef Hormones, supra note 99, at para.
125.
115. See Safrin, supra note 6, at 626.
116. See Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 10.6; see also SPS
Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 5.7.
117. See id. at art. 10.3; see also SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at
art. 5.7.
118. See supra text accompanying note 105.
119. Appellate Body-Apples, supra note 106, at para. 168.
120. Id. at para. 202.
121. Id.; see Vallely, supra note 6, at 374.
122. See Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 15.

2005]

THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL AND THE WTO

V. U.S. COMPLAINT TO THE WTO AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
CARTAGENA PROTOCOL

A. U.S. Complaint

The pending dispute between the United States and the EU came
before the WTO Dispute Settlement Body in August 2003, but arose
from activities beginning in 1998.123 Following failed consultations
between the United States and the EU, the United States requested
that the Dispute Settlement Body establish a panel to adjudicate
claims under various WTO Agreements, including the SPS
Agreement.124 The United States alleged that the EU moratorium on
the approval of products of agricultural biotechnology for placement
on the market violates WTO law and specifically restricts imports
from the United States. 25 The Panel estimates that it will issue its
final report to the Parties by the end of December 2005.126
B. Implication of the CartagenaProtocol

1. Overriding the Savings Clause
The Biotech Products dispute is the first case before the WTO
Dispute Settlement Body to implicate the Cartagena Protocol. The
dispute is governed by the SPS Agreement; the Protocol did not
come into force until a month after the United States brought its
complaint against the EU, 127 and the United States is not a party to
the Protocol. However, speculation on how the Biotech Products

123. See Biotech Products Dispute, supra note 1. Argentina and
Canada have joined the United States in alleging EU violations of
WTO Agreements.
124. Id.
125. Id. See supra note 98 for the alleged violations of the SPS
Agreement.
126. World Trade Organization, Communication from the
Chairman of the Panel, European Communities-Measures
Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products,
WT/DS291/29 (Aug. 15, 2005).
127. The United States requested a WTO Dispute Settlement Body
panel on August 7, 2003. The Cartagena Protocol entered into force
on September 11, 2003.
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dispute implicates the Protocol is a valuable assessment tool for
examining future LMO disputes.
The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties specifies rules of
governance for treaties relating to the same subject matter. 128 If one
of two treaties in question specifies that it is subject to, or not to be
considered incompatible with, the other treaty, the provisions of the
other treaty prevail. 129 Arguably, the savings clause of the Cartagena
Protocol specifies that its provisions do not supersede those of the
SPS Agreement. 130 To bring a successful claim or defense under the
Protocol, a Party must argue that it does not conflict with the SPS
Agreement and, thus, the savings clause does not apply.
For example, one commentator argues that the SPS Agreement and
the Cartagena Protocol can best be reconciled by interpreting them
as "setting up two distinctly different procedures" for international
trade regulation.' 3 ' The Cartagena Protocol treats LMOs for direct
use as food or feed, or for processing differently than LMOs not
intended for such use, including those for direct introduction to the
environment.13 2 Because LMOs for use as food, feed, or for
processing are not subject to the AIA procedure, trade restrictions
must meet the requirements of the SPS Agreement. 133 "In effect,
therefore, Article 11.8 [of the Cartagena Protocol] injects the
precautionary principle into the SPS Agreement."' 34 LMOs not for
use as food, feed, or for processing are subject to the Protocol's AIA35
Procedure, and the Cartagena precautionary principle applies.'
Such LMOs are not directly under the scope of the SPS Agreement.

128. See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, at art. 30:
"Application of successive treaties relating to the same subjectmatter."
129. Id. at art. 30(2).
130. See supra Part III.A.1.
131. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, International Trade in Living
Modified Organisms, ENVIRONMENT, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 27, 34 (Francesco Francioni ed., 2001).
132. Id.; see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
133. See Schoenbaum, supra note 131, at 34.
134. Id. at 34 (emphasis omitted).
135. Id. at 35. For a discussion on the precautionary principles of
each agreement and their compatibility see Part II.A.2. and Part
II.B.2. supra.
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Additionally, under treaties of the same subject matter, the more
specific treaty governs in its niche, and the broader treaty governs
the entire scope of the issue.1 36
Multilateral Environmental
Agreements are usually more subject-specific than trade agreements;
in a trade agreement, the rules of the environmental agreement
would likely govern. 137 The Cartagena Protocol deals specifically
with LMOs, while the SPS Agreement treats measures erected
against trade in general products that may affect health. The
Protocol could thus be said to govern a dispute over LMOs.
If the Protocol and the SPS Agreement are not interpreted as
treating the same subject matter, the SPS Agreement does not
necessarily supersede the provisions of the Cartagena Protocol. A
dispute of this nature would occur only if the parties to it were both
Members of the WTO and Parties to the Protocol. Because the
United States is not a Party to the Protocol, however, the Vienna
Convention specifies that "the treaty to which both States are parties
governs their mutual rights and obligations."' 38 This reflects the
integrity of "the contractual freedom of states according to which
their latest expression of intent prevails.'' 39 This principle of
international law applies to both treaty norms and other international
norms, including customary international law. 140 This is significant
in attempting to override the precautionary principle.
2. Precautionary Principle
The WTO Appellate Body rejected the defendants' invocation of
the SPS Agreement's precautionary principle in both the Beef
Hormones dispute and the Apples dispute.' 4' This can be attributed
in part to the pro-trade bias of the WTO.142 One commentator has
suggested that "the precautionary principle is not a viable defense in

136. See Gaston & Abate, supra note 51, at 120.
137. Id.
138. See Vienna Convention, supra note 45, at art 30(4)(b).
139. JOOST PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN

PUBLIC

How WTO LAW RELATES TO OTHER RULES OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 362 (2003).
INTERNATIONAL LAW:

140. Id.at 363.
141. See supra Part IV.
142. See Kennedy, supra note 103, at 99.
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a WTO dispute settlement proceeding."' 14 3 In the Apples dispute, the
Appellate Body was unsatisfied that there was "insufficient
evidence" of the effects of the LMO necessary to stay a Member's
obligations under Article 2.2 and to invoke the precautionary
principle. 144 In the Beef Hormones dispute, the Appellate Body held
that the EU's ban was not based on a proper risk assessment. 45 To
successfully invoke the precautionary principle in the Biotech
Products dispute, the EU must show that its moratorium on
approving the importation and marketing of LMOs was based on a
proper risk assessment as defined by the SPS Agreement.
Generally, the Member asserting a violation or defense of a WTO
provision has the burden of proof in establishing that fact. 14 6 A
Member asserting a violation must show that no relevant scientific
reports to support a sanitary or phytosanitary measure exist. 14 7 The
complaining Member may request the rationale for the protective
measure, and the Member maintaining it must provide the relevant
information. 14 8 Failure to present scientific reports would be .' a
strong indication that there are no such studies or reports." ' 149 In the
Apples dispute, the Appellate Body held that the initial burden of
proof lay with the United States to establish a prima facie violation
of Article 2.2 of the SPS Agreement, particularly that the protective
measure imposed by Japan was "'maintained without sufficient
scientific evidence."" 50 Once the United States established a prima
143. Id. at 100.
144. Appellate Body-Apples, supra note 106.
145. Appellate Body-Beef Hormones, supra note 99.
146. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 40, at 143. There are
two exceptions under the SPS Agreement: Articles 4.1 and 6.3 place
the burden of showing "equivalence" (that the sanitary or
phytosanitary measures of an exporting Member meet the
appropriate level of protection of an importing Member, even if the
measures are different) and pest- or disease-free areas on the
exporting Member. Id. at 149.
147. Id. at 150.
148. SPS Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 5.8.
149. PALMETER & MAVROIDIS, supra note 40, at 150 (quoting
World Trade Organization, Appellate Body Report, JapanMeasures Affecting Agricultural Products, WT/DS76/AB/R, para.
137 (Mar. 19, 1999)).
150. Appellate Body-Apples, supra note 106, at para. 153.
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facie violation, Japan had the burden of rebutting this claim,
following the Appellate Body ruling in the Beef Hormones
dispute -specifically, that the measures were proper under the
precautionary principle, i.e. maintained with sufficient scientific
evidence.
One commentator suggests that the burden imposed on the party
invoking the precautionary principle is directly adverse to the
prospective burdens imposed by the Cartagena Protocol. 152 The
precautionary principle of the Protocol 53 is deferential to the Party
imposing the restriction on importation both in its text and by the
heavy burden placed on the exporting country under the AIA
Procedure to demonstrate the safety of LMO exports. 154 This
conflict between the allocation of burdens between the SPS
Agreement and the Protocol complicates reconciliation of the treaties
and will 55weaken precautionary protections under the Cartagena
Protocol.
Although the WTO Appellate Body has not favored arguments
under the precautionary principle, one commentator suggests that the
precautionary principle is customary international law. 156 State
practice consistently incorporates the precautionary principle into
multilateral environmental agreements. 157 Recognized customary
1 58
law is binding on countries that have not expressly objected to it.
If the WTO Appellate Body were to consider the precautionary
principle customary international law, it might afford more
deference to measures invoked under it than if it were not treated as
an internationally recognized norm.
VI. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE LMO DISPUTES

World Trade Organization case law demonstrates reluctance to
defer to defendants' invocation of the SPS Agreement's
precautionary principle. In a WTO dispute in which both parties are
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

Id.
Vallely, supra note 6, at 376.
Protocol, supra note 3, at art. 10.6.
Vallely, supra note 6, at 376.
Id.
Bridgers, supra note 52, at 184.
See id. at 185-86.
Id. at 185.
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Parties to the Cartagena Protocol, "[a] WTO panel must take into
account also of other rules of international law, such as a defence
under an MEA [(Multilateral Environmental Agreement)] or human
rights treaty binding on both disputing parties.'' 59 If the Agreements
are read to conflict, the Vienna Convention and the Cartagena
Protocol savings clause will govern which Agreement applies. 6° ff
the Agreements are interpreted as compatible, the Cartagena
Protocol will be most successful as a defense if the WTO Dispute
Resolution Body incorporates the elements of the Protocol's
precautionary principle as permissible considerations under the SPS
Agreement precautionary principle and risk assessment procedures.
If the WTO Panel gives clout to the EU protective measures under
the SPS Agreement, provisions of the Cartagena Protocol can be
given more deference under international law. Unless the Protocol is
interpreted as such, WTO Members will seek the protection of the
WTO Dispute Settlement forum, deferential to unrestricted trade,
and the Cartagena Protocol will not attain authority as a protective
environmental measure in trade disputes.

159. PAUWELYN, supra note 139, at 117.
160. See supra Part II.A. 1.

